Transnationalizing Ethno-linguistic Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Region: Going Beyond Brubaker et al. (2006)

Abstract
With the rise of globalization and Europeanization Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities in the Carpathian Region have become ‘mobile’ in the broadest sense of the concept. This has allowed them to become independent actors in all sorts of transnational configurations. In Marácz (2014a), one of these transnational configurations has been characterized as a ‘quadratic nexus’ with at least four different actors, one of them being the ethno-linguistic minority. In this paper, I will argue that an analysis of inter-ethnic relations in terms of local dynamics, like the one elaborated in Brubaker et al. (2006) for the Romanian-Hungarian relations in the multi-ethnic, multilingual region of Romania’s Transylvania is no longer adequate against the backdrop of globalization and Europeanization. Instead ethno-linguistic minorities interact with all sorts of political, cultural, communicative, and socio-economic global and transnational networks that affect the local relations, i.e., both everyday ethnicity and the power relations.

Keywords: ethno-linguistic relations, ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, transnational configurations, quadratic nexus, minority, and language rights

Introduction
Brubaker et al. (2006) should be given credit for the fact that their work is an in-depth study of several aspects of the Romanian-Hungarian inter-ethnic conflict in Transylvania. The focus of their analysis is the two ethnic, Hungarian and Romanian communities of the “capital” of Transylvania, the town of Cluj-Napoca (Hungarian Kolozsvár, German Klausenburg) and their interaction. A central role in their analysis plays the fact that “everyday ethnicity” is a reality, which is the main topic of the second part of the book and furthermore Transylvania is viewed as a “borderland” on the cross-roads between neighbouring empires of the past and twentieth century nation-states. In the present constellation Brubaker et al. (2006) consider Transylvania as a territory, although belonging to Romania, as a kind of buffer zone where both Budapest and Bucharest each had and have their geopolitical interests. It is true that “everyday ethnicity” is relevant. Brubaker et al. (2006) unlock new fields of empirical data that have been omitted from heavily nationalized interpretations and descriptions of this complex case of intercon-

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nected ethnicity, like the observations bearing upon the multilingual context in Transylvania. Brubaker et al. (2006: 242) observe that “there are settings in which language itself – what language is spoken or how it is spoken – is likely to be noticed, discussed, or problematized”. The discussion of the language use and choice of ethnic Hungarian bilinguals has to do with an identificational expression of ethnicity, including public interaction among strangers, private talk in public places, language choice and code-switching in mixed companies, and the use of Romanian words in Hungarian conversations.

It is true that the everyday ethnic conflict between Romanians and Hungarians should be studied in the local context and that its local dynamism deserves analysis. My main criticism of the framework outlined in Brubaker et al. (2006) is that transnational concepts play a role in these analyses as well, and are sometimes referred to in the book but are not seen as central to the ethnic conflict under study. However, it is my contention that real insight into the conditions and drivers of the Romanian-Hungarian ethnic conflict can only be gained against the backdrop of globalization, transnational configurations, structures and actors, and Europeanization.

The authors see Euro-Atlantic integration as a device to keep the status quo and to control the outbreak of extreme conflicts (Brubaker 2006: 55, 125-126). But it should be pointed out that the Euro-Atlantic integration of Romania had much more effects. It has affected the social-political structures of the country, it has empowered Hungarian civic movements in Transylvania, and has provided new venues to represent the Hungarian position in the international arena.

Hagan (2009: 613) refers in her study of the Vojvodina Hungarians who share a similar position to the Transylvanian Hungarians but then in the Serbian context in connection with the latter to the so-called “boomerang model”. Hagan’s metaphor expresses the idea that ethnic minorities can set up relations with foreign actors in order to back their claims and bring local change by mobilizing foreign pressure. According to her, Vojvodina Hungarians have put pressure on the Serbian government by teaming up with foreign actors, including the Hungarian government, the US government, EU institutions, NGOs and assorted media outlets. More precisely, the Vojvodina Hungarians have relied upon the boomerang to guide their activism, to develop transnational advocacy networks to underline human rights claims and lobby-efforts, and to use the “human rights repertoire”, including a set of tactics that consists of the collection of information; the composition and framing of it into grievances and political claims; and the distribution of these claims to foreign audiences to involve foreign actors in its local conflict (Hagan 2009: 615). This complex configuration of global, transnational actors and structures gives content to the concept of “minority rights protection”. The most constant actors siding with the Vojvodina Hungarians have been their kin state Hungary and the Hungarian diaspora leaders, especially those in the US.

The boomerang model has not been a guarantee for ultimate political success, though. Vojvodina Hungarians could have triggered attention in 1999 in the shadow of the Kosovo crisis and again in connection to Kosovo in 2004, when a series of interethnic incidents of violence and discrimination began, lasting for over a year and a half. In March 2004, tensions in Kosovo and southern Serbia erupted into violence and threats between ethnic groups. However, Vojvodina Hungarians failed to mobilize the international political actors in those periods.
This demonstrates that the basic scenario of the boomerang model – that an aggrieved group can secure foreign support using moderate strategies exhibits also limits. The Vojvodina Hungarian leaders looked for Hungarian MEPs and Western engagement with the minority to lobby in the European Parliament and with the European Commission’s country reports, the OSCE and its High Commissioner on National Minorities. However, the Commission and Council were hesitant. Since Hungary’s accession to the EU Hungarian MEPs have raised the claims and demands of the Vojvodina Hungarians but with little success however. The European Commission has tried to downplay the minority rights of the Vojvodina Hungarians in order to reinforce peace and stability in Vojvodina (Hagan 2009: 623) and pro-Hungarian lobby-activities were less successful, when Western political interests were contradicted. Hagan (2009: 628) discusses further blocking factors, including international actors to prioritise relations with the state authorities; their prioritisation of building a broad opposition movement rather than an ethnic-specific movement; their declining strategic interest in the Central and Eastern European region; and their concern for coming ethnic conflict (Hagan 2009: 628). The limitations on the Vojvodina Hungarians’ transnationalization efforts have been considerable, though. Last but not least, successive Serbian governments have rejected political claims by the Vojvodina Hungarians.

However, even though the ultimate success is limited, this reference to the boomerang model unambiguously demonstrates how important transnational processes are in inter-ethnic conflicts. Although Brubaker et al. (2006) do not elaborate on the boomerang model, their analysis bears upon the local context the book refers to the importance of transnational configurations, structures, actors and so on.

Firstly, supranational institutions have had an impact on the political manoeuvring of the Hungarian political representatives gathered in the Democratic Alliance for Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). Brubaker et al. (2006: 148, fn. 95) report that with the support of the OSCE High Commissioner DAHR contributed to the changing of the governance structure of the Babeş-Bolyai University allowing separate Hungarian departments, institutes and tracks in the framework of a multilingual, multicultural university. This has become reality with the introduction of the Educational Law 1/2011. I will return to this case in more detail below.

Secondly, migration of Transylvanian Hungarians to Hungary is due according to the authors by a desire to flourish economically in Hungary (Brubaker 2006: 371), like Hungarian-language university education, and qualifying students for labour in Hungary. This is viewed in Brubaker et al. as an “exit” option that has caused the hindering of the formation of a radicalised, violence-prone Transylvanian Hungarian minority elite (Brubaker 2006: 163, fn. 153) losing its supporters and accelerating rather than arresting the demographic decline of Hungarians in Transylvania (Brubaker 2006: 369-370). Brubaker et al. remark that it is ironic that the international and transnational openness of the Romanian state, not its nationalistic closure, that had fostered the ongoing process of nationalization. This may disconnect the Transylvanian Hungarians that left Romania from the Romanian world. This is however not automatically the case. Ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania may set up a transnational connection with the Hungarian community in Transylvania and that can have a major impact on what is happening in the local socio-economic, political level playing field at home.
Thirdly, Brubaker et al. (2006: 373) argue that the self-production of the Hungarian world has been successful under nationalization efforts of the Romanian state but that in the age of post-nationalism and transnationalism the nationalization of the poly-ethnic and poly-lingual, multicultural Transylvania continues, even when in the new age the nation-state is weaker and claims of DAHR for autonomy, for extensive rights to the public use of Hungarian and a Hungarian university were realized in full (Brubaker et al. 2006: 373). However, even if it is true that the Romanian nation state has become weaker, the transnational contexts of mixed families and mixed working places have favoured the assimilation of ethnic Hungarians.

The first part of this paper is centred on the concept of the nationalizing state in the sense of Brubaker (1996). First, I will discuss Romania’s ethno-linguistic diversity and Romania as a nationalizing state in which a hegemonic constitution plays a central role in the nationalizing policies. In this paper, I will discuss some aspects of the nationalizing Romanian state policies, especially its constitution and legal system that have introduced the concept of ‘national minority’ and ‘language hierarchy’, both at the expense of the Hungarian community. This part would fit in with the analysis defended in Brubaker (2006) to consider the Hungarian-Romanian ethnic conflict in Transylvania first and foremost as a local conflict. However, going beyond Brubaker et al. (2006) means that transnational configurations, structures and actors play a much more important role in the analysis of the local conflict. Hence, the second part of the paper reflects on transnationalism in which the supranational level plays an extremely important role. Here the triadic nexus of Brubaker et al. (2006), i.e. the local dynamics between the national minority, the Transylvanian Hungarian minority, its kin-state Hungary and its host state, the nationalizing state Romania is turned into a quadratic nexus by adding to it the supranational level. The norms and standards of the supranational institutions, actors and so on, which Romania has joined in 2007, has given the local Hungarian minority more space to manoeuvre (Kymlicka 1996, 2008; Kymlicka and Opalski 2001; Vizi 2002, 2012; Schimmel-fennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2006). Due to Europeanization, including the democratization of the public sphere of Romania, multilingualism has received more recognition. In concrete terms this means that the Hungarian and other minority languages have strengthened their position. An important role has been played by the minority rights protection of the Copenhagen criteria for joining the European Union and the charters of the Council of Europe that provide more recognition to minority rights, including linguistic rights. As an outcome of this European integration a recent educational law has recognized multilingual, multicultural institutions that can facilitate the use of Hungarian and other minority languages in higher education. Due to Europeanization and democratization civic and language activist organisations have been established and have put on the agenda the multilingual use of Hungarian and other minority languages in Romania. Although the Romanian language is the official language of the state and enjoys a hegemonic position opposed to other languages, during the recent presidential elections for the first time Hungarian voters were addressed by the two Romanian candidates or their close representatives in Hungarian. The ethnic Hungarian vote was obviously too important to lose due to the fact that there was a neck-and-neck race between the Romanian candidates. Transnational norms and standards of multilingualism and multilingual communication have also been implemented in Romanian practice, although
there is a contradiction with the Constitution and the legal system that guarantees the Romanian language a hegemonic position.

**Romania’s ethno-linguistic diversity**

In Romania, most of the ethnic Hungarians live in the north-western part of the country, i.e. the Transylvanian area which is traditionally a multi-ethnic region. In fact, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania lives in the northern part of the area stretching from the Hungarian-Romanian country border to Szeklerland at the feet of the Eastern Carpathians mountains deep in the centre of present-day Romania. The Szeklers (Hun. Székely) are an ethnic Hungarian group in Transylvania displaying a peculiar set of ethnographic, cultural and linguistic features. In the Hungarian kingdom, they were employed as border guards defending the isolated Eastern Carpathian mountain range. In this 'stroke', the ethnic Hungarians are not present in equal concentrations. The Hungarian minority counted by the latest 2011 census amounted to 1,227,663 persons who make up around 6.5 percent of the population of Romania. In the Transylvanian area where almost all of the ethnic Hungarians live, the percentages of geo-ethnic distribution of ethnic Hungarians and Romanians differ from the national percentages.

In the whole of the Transylvanian territory the ethnic Hungarians make up around fifteen percent of the total population, while the ethnic Romanians number around seventy percent. However, the percentages of ethnic Hungarians are again much higher in Transylvanian sub-regions of Romania where the ethnic Hungarians actually live in more or less concentrated areas. The Hungarian ethno-linguistic distribution displays an unequal and heterogeneous pattern, however. The ethnic Hungarians basically inhabit three spatially connected sub-regions with a different geo-ethnic distribution. The first sub-region is located in the Hungarian-Romanian border area in the former eastern Hungarian region and present-day Northwest Romania, i.e. ‘Partium’. In this area, a substantial percentage of ethnic Hungarians constitute an absolute or relative majority in a number of municipalities and districts, especially in cities like Oradea (Hun. Nagyvárad) and Satu Mare (Hun. Szatmárnémeti). The second sub-region, the area landward is central Transylvania with the major city of Cluj-Napoca (Hun. Kolozsvár). In this region, ethnic Hungarians are often smaller minorities than in the Partium area and they often live in mixed Hungarian-Romanian-Roma communities, but in some municipalities and districts they can have a relative or absolute majority (Brubaker et al. 2006). The third sub-region, which is matching the historical area of Szeklerland (Hun. Székelyföld; Rom. Ținutul Secuiesc) is of about 13,000 km² and consists of the three provinces, i.e. Harghita (Hun. Hargita), Covasna (Hun. Kovászna) and Mureș (Hun. Maros), although most parts of the province of Mureș fall inside the traditional region of Szeklerland. According to the 2002 census, the population of Szeklerland counted 809,000 persons of whom 612,043 are ethnic Hungarians yielding around 76 percent of the total. Ethnic Hungarians on average represent 59 percent of the populations in the Harghita, Covasna and Mureș provinces over all. Almost half of the Transylvanian Hungarians live in Szeklerland and they are in an absolute majority.
Note that the traditional Szeklerland is not recognized by the Romanian state. The term ‘Szeklerland’ itself does not appear in any official national or international document ratified by the Romanian state. In two of the three Szekler provinces the ethnic Hungarians have a clear majority according to the 2002 census. The percentages of the ethnic Hungarians are higher in Harghita and Covasna, i.e. 84.8 percent and 73.58 percent respectively, and much lower in Mureș, i.e. 37.82 percent. Compared to the census of 2002 the percentages of ethnic Hungarians in the three provinces of Szeklerland have hardly changed in the 2011 census. Actually there is an increasing concentration of ethnic Hungarians in Szeklerland. In Harghita, Covasna and Mureș, the percentages and absolute figures of the ethnic Hungarian population are as follows: 85.21 percent (257,707 persons); 73.74 percent (150,468 persons); and 38.09 percent (200,858 persons) respectively.

Nationalizing states in Europe

In essence, the tactics to ensure power and control with the introduction of a hegemonic language has been applied at a larger scale in the age of nationalism that followed the French Revolution (Bourdieu 1991). Everywhere in Europe where nation states arose, a language, mostly the language of the group in power, became the dominating paradigm for communication with and within the state guaranteeing that specific groups dominating the language of nation state formation could take control of the state’s governance structures. Such states were designed as national states selecting the language of the majority group for official communication.

Note, however, that the “ideal” state of affairs, i.e. one nation using a pure language for official communication has never been achieved. Dialects or other languages treated as “foreign”, even though they were indigenous, remained and were spoken and used even after a selection of an official language was made. The other, non-state languages have been classed under the misleading term ‘minority languages’, because the patterns, modes and traditions of language use were much more complicated than a simple opposition in terms of a numerical majority and minority speakers is able to capture. However, it was sufficient to exclude minority language speakers from the power structure of the so-called national state (Edwards 2010). In everyday ethnic practice to refer to a key concept of Brubaker et al. (2006) a situation of language contact remained and according to linguists that have been studying patterns of language contact, the power element is always present in the contact between two languages, i.e. especially in the relation between majority and minority languages. Notice that this linguistic observation of Nelde and others correlates with the analysis of a political scientist, like Pierre Bourdieu on ‘the language policy of exclusion’ (Bourdieu 1991; Nelde 1983; Nelde 1987; Nelde 1995)

Cases of linguistic hegemony and multilingual communication that result in far more complicated linguistic and communicational patterns trigger conflicts. These conflicts are basically political conflicts displaying an asymmetric structure. The language groups not controlling the state language are excluded from power and the groups being excluded from power are strugg-
The end of the twentieth century left us with numerous such struggles over the inclusion and exclusion of indigenous linguistic minority groups. In Europe only a few cases have been solved successfully within the existing state patterns with the consent of both or more of the parties involved in such language conflicts. In most places, however, an embittered struggle, even though some modest international regulations in the framework of supranational forums have been elaborated, between linguistic groups is taking place and is the ‘exclusion-inclusion dilemma’ of speakers of the other, non-standard languages on the agenda. This gives rise to a variety of political conflicts. The Transylvanian case is no exception.

The Romanian Constitution

The Romanian Constitution declares Romania an ‘indivisible and unitary nation state’ (see article 1.1), and the constitution does define national communities or minorities only at the individual or personal level as ‘persons belonging to a national minority’ (see article 6.1). Hence, the minority rights and minority language rights are considered in fact personal, individual rights. Observe furthermore that the Romanian Constitution stipulates a hegemonic position for the Romanian language. Article 13 of the Romanian Constitution declares that the Romanian language is the only official language of the country. This has far-reaching consequences for the multi-ethnic and multilingual communities of Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and Roma in Transylvania. Next to the constitutional article specifying the official language of the state, further legal instruments have been designed in order to restrict the use of Hungarian and other minority languages, like laws specifying when the Hungarian language may be used and what percentage of the total inhabitants of an administrative-territorial unit must be ethnic Hungarians in order to use Hungarian officially. The second paragraph of article 120 of the Romanian Constitution guarantees the use of Hungarian in administrative authorities and public services and this is further specified by government decision No. 1206, from 27 November 2001, regarding the Law on Local Public administration no. 215/2001, Paragraph 19, Article 2, stating:

Authorities of public and local administrations, public institutions subordinated to them as well as decentralized public services, ensure the use of the mother tongue in their relationships with national minorities, in those administrative-territorial units in which the percentage of citizens belonging to national minorities are over 20 percent; all according to the Constitution, the present law and the international treaties to which Romania is a party.

Article 120 of the Romanian Constitution has been implemented in the Law on Local Public Administration of 2001 (Horváth et al. 2010: 7-9) where more provisions of language use in local public administration are spelled out and it has been interwoven in the Romanian Educational Law (Janssens et al. 2013: 16-17) to which we will return below.

One of these provisions, quite particular to the Central and Eastern parts of Europe, is the threshold rule. Hence, the twenty percent arrangement in Romania might seem reasonable from the point of view of the state it is still subject to intra-state politics and to the changing
relations between the host state, the kin state and the external minority (Brubaker 1996; Tóth 2004; Kovács-Tóth 2009; Batory 2010; Mabry et al. 2013). It leads in fact to all sorts of anomalies. As follows from the Romanian Constitution and Law on Public Administration and Education the Hungarian speaking inhabitants of Transylvania’s “capital” Cluj-Napoca were not allowed to use Hungarian for contact and communication with the municipal administration because, according to the 2002 census, only 19.9 percent of the inhabitants had registered as ethnic Hungarians (Brubaker et al. 2006). Note that around 60,000 Hungarian-speaking people live in the city, which is much more than in the smaller Transylvanian towns with a Hungarian majority, where Hungarian can be used in communication with the administration (Marácz 2011a). The latest census does not change this anomaly. According to the 2011 census the percentage of the Hungarian inhabitants of Cluj-Napoca dropped to sixteen percent, i.e. around 50,000 persons from the total inhabitants of Cluj-Napoca that is around 309,136,00.

The threshold rule has also consequences for the linguistic landscape. In Romania bilingual municipality signs are dependent on the twenty percent threshold (see administrative law 2001/215). So in a bilingual city, like Cluj-Napoca there are neither official topographic signs in Hungarian.

In sum, the Law on Local Public Administration gives ethnic Hungarian citizens specific rights in terms of communication and language use but it is restricted by a threshold in a specific administrative-territorial domain. So, the Territoriality Principle is relevant here but it is actually operating as a “container” of the Personality Principle (McRae 1975; Dembinska et al. 2014). Language rights for national and ethnic minorities are not guaranteed when the percentage of citizens belonging to a national minority is below twenty percent of the population in a certain administrative-territorial unit. So this may imply that even when there is a large community of citizens belonging to a national minority in absolute numbers language rights are not guaranteed. Let us turn to a discussion of the transnational configurations, structures and actors involved in the Transylvanian case.

**Quadratic nexus**

As long as the cases of multilingualism and complex diversity were “local”, often within a region or the borders of a nation state, linguistic conflicts had a limited scope. These conflicts did not have to cause the outbreak of large-scale violence, but the constant tension between linguistic groups might have a paralysing effect on the functioning of the state and may traumatize the speakers involved. Due to globalization with its interconnectedness all over, local communicative conflicts are not restricted any more to local spaces but might cause a “spill-over” in the international arena (Holton 2011). International relations in the world of globalization form a complex web in which the classical state actors are joined by transnational institutional and non-institutional actors. The non-institutional actors can influence the politics of international relations by using the Internet and penetrating the media (Vertovec 2010). Following Smith and Brubaker, it will be claimed that these local conflicts embedded in the international relations web form a complicated transnational configuration (Smith 2002; Brubaker 1996). In fact, in these multilingual, communicative conflicts four actors are involved, i.e. the nation-
alizing state, other language groups, the external linguistic homeland or kin state of these
groups and the supranational forums. Following Smith, I will refer to these transnational com-
municational patterns as the ‘quadratic nexus’ (Smith 2002; Marácz 2011a; 2011c; Korshun-
ova & Marácz 2012). Due to the lack of international norms and standards and the compli-
cated set of factors involved it is the interplay of the four poles in the quadratic nexus that is
deciding on the outcome of these communicational conflicts (Sasse 2005a). This quadratic
nexus will be used as an analytic framework in the discussion below.

Apart from ethnic Hungarians in Romania Hungarians are living in several Central Euro-
pean states due to historic restructuring after the First and Second World War and the collapse
of communism in 1989. There is an extensive literature from different disciplines that describes
and analyses the position of ethnic Hungarian communities in the neighbouring states of Hun-
gary. These states include next to Romania Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, and
Slovenia. Especially the ethno-linguistic Hungarian communities in Romania and Slovakia are
substantial in size, i.e. 1.5 million and 500,000 respectively (Fowler 2002; Kántor et al. 2004;
Tóth 2004; Fenyvesi 2005; Csergo 2007; Gal 2008; Kovács and Tóth 2009; Batory 2010;
Deets 2010).

The four actors involved in the quadratic nexus of the Hungarian cases have the following
objectives. From a linguistic point of view, the nationalizing states have been trying to assimil-
ate their Hungarian communities with different and changing intensity, as Brubaker et al.
(2006) report. Their language policy has been designed to exclude the Hungarian language
from the official domains or allow it only marginally. The Hungarian linguistic minorities have
been struggling for the recognition of their language rights. After the collapse of communism
the Central European states have been using political tools to reach their goals offered by a
democratic society in development. The external homeland Hungary has employed several
strategies to support the struggle of their co-nationals in Hungary’s neighbouring countries.
Only in the late period of communism did Hungary give some support to its co-nationals and
in the beginning of the nineties after the collapse of communism this support was intensified.
The supranational community has been drafting modest linguistic minority rights mainly for
stability and security reasons in Central Europe (Sasse 2005b). This has empowered the Hun-
garian linguistic groups all over Central Europe (See for Transcarpathia Anikó Beregszászi and
István Csernicskó 2003; see for Transylvania Brubaker et al. 2006; see for Slovenia Anna Kol-
láth 2003; see for Croatia Nádor & Szarka 2003; see for Vojvodina Sarnyai & Pap 2011; see
for Slovakia Gizella Szabómihály 2003; and see for Austria Szoták 2003). As a consequence,
there are some minimum conditions for Hungarian language use but there is no single norm
or standard for Hungarian minority speakers practising their Hungarian language in Central
Europe.

Transnational actors

Apart from the “national space” that is defined by the geo-ethnic distribution and the legal
system there is not only the national space but also the transnational one. After the collapse of
communism and the expansion of the European Union eastwards global and transnational
structures have led to the introduction of European human rights norms and standards in the field of minority rights and minority language rights. Even more robust policies in support of indigenous minority rights and languages have been adopted by the Council of Europe of which all the Member States of the European Union must be members. Although the Council of Europe has no sanctioning mechanism, if these resolutions are not met (Marácz 2011b), it has formulated clear legal treaties to protect national minorities and their languages, including the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) signed on February 1, 1995 and November 5, 1992 in Strasbourg respectively (Trifunovska 2001). The Framework Convention supports the positive discrimination of national minorities on the basis of human rights and general freedom rights. It recognizes the fact that minority rights are group rights and that cross-border cooperation is not only restricted to states but that also local and regional authorities can take part in this. The Language Charter has been motivated by similar considerations. Languages are seen as part of a common European cultural heritage and the protection of languages is deemed necessary to counterbalance assimilative state policy and uniformisation by modern civilization (Brubaker et al. 2006, Marácz 2011b).

Note that all the Central and Eastern European states with Hungarian linguistic minorities have ratified these charters as is shown in tables 1 and 2:

**Table 1: Framework Convention (FCPNM, CETS no. 157)**

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<th>Entry into Force</th>
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<td>01/09/2001</td>
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<td>01/02/1995</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15/09/1995</td>
<td>26/01/1998</td>
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**Table 2: Language Charter (ECRML, CETS no. 148)**

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Another side effect of the transnational configurations is that they have led to the softening of borders. As a result, the whole concept of ‘ethno-linguistic allegiances’ straddling borders is on the agenda again after being an anathema in the Cold War (Mabry 2013, Marácz 2014b). Note that the Central and Eastern European states with Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities, including Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, Ukraine and the kin state Hungary are part of the Carpathian Macro-region in which there is a free communicative interaction in the public space and the Hungarian language communities all over the Carpathian Macroregion enjoy some legal protection due to these two conventions (Janssens et al. 2013). These conventions provide protection for the speakers of Hungarian in the states where the Hungarian language is a minority language (Skovgaard 2007). Note that in the Carpathian Macroregion, although it matches for a large part with territories that belonged to the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Hungarian is spoken as a vernacular covering a much wider territory than Hungary or Transylvania. Hence, in the Carpathian Macroregion we have the following language constellation from the perspective of the Hungarian speakers. Hungarian is a transnational regional vernacular in a wider region: L1-speakers in Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and Croatia (Marácz 2014b). The Hungarian language is used by Hungarian minority speakers in order to communicate with Hungarian speakers from Hungary and with the other Hungarian minority speakers in Central and East European states. The official state language is however used by Hungarian minority speakers as well – being multilingual speakers – with the authorities and L1-speakers of the Romanian and other state languages. However, L1-speakers of the state languages have a monolingual attitude (Brubaker et. al. 2006). This asymmetric relation is a source of conflict. The majority speakers have more power – their language enjoys a hegemonic position – than the minority speakers whose languages are almost excluded from the official and public domains in some countries. On the other hand there are a number of non-Hungarian L1-speakers who have developed a receptive competence of Hungarian in the Carpathian Macroregion. Hence, it is expected that the use of communication modes as lingua receptiva or code-switching and mixing will be more frequent. Such forms of bi- and multilingual intercourse can be found in the urban spaces in Transylvania. As a consequence, the position of Hungarian as a regional vehicular language is becoming stronger in the Carpathian Macroregion resulting into increasing patterns of multilingualism.

**Multilingual institutions**

Article 120 of the Romanian Constitution has been implemented not only in the Law on Local Public Administration of 2001 (Horváth et al. 2010: 7-9), as discussed above but also in the Romanian Educational Law (Janssens et al. 2013: 16-17). The latter gives the Romanian Hungarians the right to establish their own educational institutions. This is not only relevant for the teaching of the Hungarian language but also for the teaching of the Romanian language to non-Romanians. Hungarians complain about the fact that in the Romanian educational system the Romanian language is taught to them, as if Romanian were their L1. However, for ethnic Hungarians Romanian should be taught rather as a foreign, L2 language. Note that the
Law on Local Public Administration and the Education Law are framed in terms of the Personality Principle because rights are assigned to individual citizens. As I discussed above the Territoriality Principle is not an option. The Educational Law of 1/2011 specifies when the Hungarian language can be used as the language of instruction in educational institutions. The Educational Law is flexible in a way because it does not specify the place of the educational institute but refers to the number of pupils needed to form Hungarian classes being restricted by a minimum number.

Article 135 of the Educational Law 1/2011 also specifies that three institutes for higher education where already national minorities’ programmes exist in so-called multilingual, multicultural institutions have the right to establish ‘mother tongue tracks’ (Janssens et al. 2013: 17). The three institutions include the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Rom. Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Hun. Babeş-Bolyai Tudományegyetem), the University of Arts of Târgu-Mureş (Rom. Universitatea de Arte din Târgu-Mureş, Hun. Marosvásárhelyi Művészeti Egyetem), and University of Medicine and Pharmacy of Tîrgu Mureş (Rom. Universitatea de Medicină şi Farmacie Tîrgu Mureş, Hun. Marosvásárhelyi Orvosi és Gyógyszerészeti Egyetem). All these three universities are in the Transylvania area and are traditionally attended by ethnic Hungarians. Following article 135 of Educational Law 1/2011 different language tracks have been introduced at these institutions for higher education. Apart from Romanian and Hungarian English is a language of tuition at these institutions as well. At the Babeş-Bolyai University German is a language of teaching as well in accordance with the traditional presence of the German language in Transylvania. So this university has a quadralingual profile, that is Romanian, Hungarian, English and German. Although the Educational Law allows for the introduction of different language tracks in these institutions this has not been successful in all the three ‘multicultural, multilingual’ universities. The reprofiling of the University of Medicine and Pharmacy of Tîrgu Mureş has been stagnating so far and the negotiations between the Romanian and Hungarian stakeholders are in progress. This process of re-profiling in terms of language tracks has been more successful at the Babeş-Bolyai University.

At the Babeş-Bolyai University there has been a priority to separate Hungarian and Romanian tracks, whenever this is possible. Making use of the legal right to establish its own Hungarian teaching track the Philosophy Department was split into two sections, a Romanian and a Hungarian one. The staff members and the students agreed that language in the case of philosophy is extremely important. Hence, the decision was taken to split the Department into two language sections, that is a Romanian and Hungarian one. However, the staff, i.e. both Romanians and Hungarians, of the Institute of Political Science decided not to split the Department into two sections but rather to increase the number of courses that are taught in the Hungarian language without setting up a complete, separate administration for it. Due to the fact that the Romanian collaborators of the Institute for Political Science have no command of the Hungarian language, English has become more and more the language of mutual communication in the Department itself. But not only some of the university state institutions have the possibility to implement a multilingual policy but also state sponsored research institutes, like the institute for the study of ethnic and minority issues, the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (Rom. Institutul Pentru Studiera Problemelor Minorităţilor,
Civic and language activism

Implementation of language rights for ethnic Hungarians in Romania in the official and public domain has been put on the agenda by several civil rights organizations. These organizations try to raise awareness among the population for the introduction of Romanian-Hungarian multilingualism in Transylvania without crossing the boundaries of the present legal system (Kovács 2003; Kovács and Tóth 2009). A civil rights group that is working on the empowerment of the Hungarian language and the introduction of bi- and multilingualism in the framework of the Romanian legal system is the Civic Engagement Movement (Hun. Civil Elkötelezettség Mozgalom (CEMO); Rom. Mişcarea Angajament Civic). CEMO is based in the town of Tîrgu Mureş (Hun. Marosvásárhely) which is part of the historic Szeklerland. According to the 2011 census the ratio between the Romanian and Hungarian population is almost in balance, that is 51.9 percent (66,000) and 45.2 percent (57,000) of the 134,000 inhabitants in total. The Romanian and Hungarian population together make up around 95 percent of the total population of Tîrgu Mureş. Note that the percentage of the Hungarian population in this town is far over the threshold of 20 percent as fixed in the Law on Local Public Administration required to introduce the Hungarian language as an official language and to realize full Romanian-Hungarian bilingualism in this municipality. This is the legal basis for the language activism pursued by CEMO.

CEMO’s website (see www.cemo.ro) is trilingual, i.e. Romanian, Hungarian and English. A Mahatma Gandhi quote on the opening page of the website indicates that CEMO is ready to use first and foremost peaceful activism within the legal Romanian framework to reach their objectives. The activism of CEMO displays a modern European outlook and their language activists are trained in the circuit of European NGOs offering training and support. CEMO has organized several civic language rights campaigns that were unprecedented in connection with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

CEMO regularly protested against an exclusive Romanian linguistic landscape in Târgu Mureş, although according to paragraph 4 of article 76 of the Law on Local Public Administration 215/2001 street signs and other public signs in public offices and institutions must be in the minority language as well, when the percentage of citizens belonging to a national minority are over 20 percent in an administrative-territorial domain. CEMO referring to this law protested successfully against the ‘Romanian-only’ website of the town’s mayoral office and against Romanian monolingual signs in post offices, the mayor’s office, the culture palace, wedding rooms, police stations, offices of the national bank, and the chamber of commerce in the town of Tîrgu Mureş.

CEMO also campaigned for the legitimate right to address local authorities in the minority languages of Romania. The civil rights organization started to collect data on language rights and language use in official institutions and sent out a questionnaire in Hungarian to public institutions in town. The questionnaire inquired about language choice and use in Hungarian
in 76 of the state institutions in Târgu Mureș. A quarter of the institutions, i.e. 19 answered both in Hungarian and Romanian. Thirteen institutions, i.e. 17 percent answered only in Romanian. Eleven institutions, i.e. 14 percent replied to the CEMO questionnaire but noted that the questionnaire should be drafted in the state language. However, almost half of the respondents, 33, i.e. 44 percent did not answer at all. From this campaign, CEMO concluded that ethnic Romanians having no knowledge of Hungarian are overrepresented in state institutions and that ethnic Hungarians have not enough knowledge of the public administration vocabulary in Hungarian. The latter was sometimes admitted by Hungarian speaking respondents in their replies. The activities of CEMO are not only restricted to the national arena but CEMO targeted transnational organization as the Council of Europe as well setting up a boomerang in the sense of Hagan discussed above.

Above it was referred to that the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has been signed by Romania as well and that it has boosted the Hungarian language use of ethnic Hungarians (Gal 2000; Trifunovska 2001; Skovgaard 2007; and Marácz 2011). It gives the Hungarian language inside recognition within Romania and protection from outside the Romanian state (Marácz 2011a). Romania signed the Charter in July 1995, but only ratified it much later on 24 October 2007 (Law nr. 282 from 24 October 2007). This law states that the provisions of the Charter will apply to ten minority languages which are used in Romania, including Hungarian. The Charter ensures the use of regional and minority languages in various and significant areas of life, including education, public administration, the judicial system, media and in the context of social life and cultural activities. CEMO also managed to lobby the international monitors of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in the sense of the boomerang model. In January 2011, the civic organization compiled a ‘Shadow Report to the Initial Periodical Report on the Implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in Romania.’ The initial Periodical Report was submitted on 26 October 2010. It was clear that CEMO tried to put pressure on the second cycle of the State Report. CEMO’s lobbying was successful because the findings of their report were picked up in the evaluation report of the Committee of Experts released on 30 November 2011 taking sides against the threshold of twenty percent considering this incompatible with article 10 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Charter on the functioning of administrative authorities and public services and proposed to get rid of the threshold.

Language activism in order to empower Hungarian language use in Transylvania have been initiated by companies and shopkeepers as well. The initiative that uses the Hungarian slogan ‘Igen, tessék!’ "Yes, Please” can be viewed as an action not only for empowering Hungarian customers to speak Hungarian, when they are shopping in Transylvanian multilingual communities but also for shops, businesses, and so on to attract Hungarian speaking customers. The ‘Igen, tessék-movement’ employs two ways to indicate that in their members, like shops, businesses, hotels, and so on Hungarian is being spoken as well. Firstly, they are present in social media, there is a trilingual, i.e. Romanian, Hungarian, and English website (see www.igen-tesskek.ro). On the website the shops, businesses and so on are listed where consumers and buyers can be served in Hungarian. So far this civil movement is active in three Transylvanian towns, i.e. Cluj-Napoca, Târgu Mureș and Sighetu Marâției (Hun. Mâramaroszsiget). Secondly, apart from the slogan the main attribute of the initiative is a green sticker that can be pasted...
on the display window or on the front door with the slogan ‘Igen, tessék’ “Yes, please!” It is a real bilingual sign, for the slogan’s Romanian equivalent, i.e. ‘da, poftiți!’ is also depicted on the sticker but under the Hungarian inscription and in smaller letters.

Presidential elections

Regularly, Romanian-Hungarian asymmetric bilingualism turned also up in all sorts of election campaigns so far. Hungarian politicians have quite often been using the Romanian language, especially in national or European election where Hungarian candidates had to debate with their Romanian counterparts. Their Romanian colleagues never spoke Hungarian in the electoral campaigns. This was also true for the language on election materials, like posters, badges, newspaper advertisements and so on. In sum, Hungarian political parties communicated their messages also in Hungarian or used bilingual Hungarian-Romanian communication, but not vice versa. Interestingly this has changed in the recent electoral campaign for the presidential elections.

The latest Romanian presidential elections took place in November 2014 over two rounds on November 2 and 16. Due to the fact that none of the candidates was able to get an absolute majority of the votes in the first round a second round was necessary. The best two candidates of the first round were able to take part in the second round. Victor Ponta representing the Social Democratic Party (PSD) took the lead in the first round with 40 percent of the votes, while the candidate of the Christian Liberal Alliance (ACL, a coalition of two parties PNL and PDL), Klaus Iohannis, a descendant of the Transylvanian Saxon-Germans got into the second round with 30 percent of the votes. The election map of Romania depicting the first round clearly shows that Ponta received the majority of his votes on the other side of the Carpathians, whereas Iohannis got the majority of his votes in Transylvania. In the first round the Szekler provinces with a Hungarian majority, Covasna and Harghita voted in majority for the Hungarian candidate Hunor Kelemen representing DAHR. Note however that in the second round Iohannis’ position in Transylvania even got stronger and he also won the two Hungarian provinces of Covasna and Harghita, although after the first round the leadership of the DAHR did advice its voters not to vote for Klaus Iohannis who clearly won the elections with 54.43 percent of the votes against Victor Ponta who did not get more than 45.56 percent of the votes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Ponta</th>
<th>Iohannis</th>
<th>Kelemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covasna</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First round</td>
<td>13.69 %</td>
<td>14.90 %</td>
<td>50.41 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second round</td>
<td>22.05 %</td>
<td>77.95 %</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Harghita</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First round</td>
<td>8.13 %</td>
<td>20.22 %</td>
<td>62.97 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second round</td>
<td>22.22 %</td>
<td>79.78 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Results for the presidential election in November 2014 in the provinces of Covasna and Harghita
Although the first round was a clear victory for Ponta, it was predicted that the second round between Ponta and Iohannis would be a neck-and-neck race. Because it was to be expected that the margins of the victory would be small, interestingly the Romanian candidates targeted the Hungarian speaking electorate for the first time in the history of the Romanian elections also in the Hungarian language. Ponta’s PSD distributed a Hungarian-Romanian bilingual poster with the Romanian phrase ‘Victor Ponta Președinte’ “Victor Ponta president” and two Hungarian phrases ‘Érte vagyunk’ “We are for him” and ‘Rá szavazunk’ “We vote for him”. Note that the first phrase seems to be a mirror translation from Romanian meaning “We support him” but the Hungarian equivalent is ungrammatical. Klaus Iohannis also got support in the Hungarian language between the two rounds. The prominent party member of the ACL coalition, the former foreign minister, Prime Minister and Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu posted a short video clip on November 12, 2014 of one minute and four seconds on You Tube in which he explains in Hungarian why Romanian and Hungarian voters should vote for Iohannis. Ungureanu’s Hungarian speech is subtitled in Romanian (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTVBb2MvQ3g, accessed at February 11, 2015).

Conclusions

In this paper, I have argued that the study of Brubaker et al. (2006) should be credited for the fact that it has undertaken an in-depth study into the inter-ethnic relations between Romanians and Hungarians in Romania, more in particular in the Transylvanian town of Cluj-Napoca. Although in the book reference is made to the role of transnational configurations, structures and actors in interethnic conflicts these are neglected in the analyses. In this paper, I have demonstrated the relevance of transnational configurations, structures and actors in the interethnic relations between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. This was earlier argued for in Hagan (2006) who used the boomerang metaphor in order to refer to transnational configurations, structures and actors boosting the empowerment of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina.

At this place, I have discussed five cases in which transnational configurations, structures and actors play an eloquent role in the analysis of the interethnic relations in Transylvania. I have discussed the ‘quadratic nexus’ as a model of international relations in which there is also a nexus between the local minority and all sorts of inter- and supranational actors that might cause the boomerang effect in the sense of Hagan (2006). A member of the quadratic nexus are also the supranational fora, like the Council of Europe and others whose norms and standards “spill over” to countries joining them, like Romania with national and ethnic minorities. The Language Charta protecting the local minority and regional languages in national states with a different official language is a clear example of such a transnational intervention. Against the backdrop of such configurations norms and standards carry over to the establishment of multilingual and multinational institutions. This is the case in some Transylvanian higher educational institutions as well. The democratization of the level-playing field due to the “spill over” effect of democratic norms and standards by the European Union have opened up the arena for
civic and language activism in its member-states, like Romania. In Romania, NGOs protecting the civic and language rights of ethnic minorities, like Hungarians and Roma have received more possibilities and opportunities to express their grievances via peaceful activism within the framework of the law state than in the pre-European Union age of the country.

Finally, Romanian presidential elections have been dominated by Romanian political parties so far. This has triggered the one-sided use of the Romanian majority and official language. However, a democratic institution as presidential elections have made it possible for the Hungarian language to receive recognition. It has turned out that the votes of the ethnic Hungarians are too important to neglect for the outcome of the elections. This was the case in the 2014 presidential elections that were a neck-and-neck race between Romanian speaking candidates. As a consequence, Romanian candidates addressed ethnic Hungarian voters in their mother tongue, Hungarian. In sum, these five contexts unambiguously demonstrate that transnational configurations, structures and actors play an important role in providing insight into inter-ethnic conflicts. If this is correct the analysis of such conflicts in terms of Brubaker et al. (2006) where there is too much focus on the local conflicts and their dynamics are insufficient. This means we have to go beyond Brubaker et al. (2006).

References


Files:
